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Abstract
Purpose The linear and power QALY models require that
people in Time Trade-off (TTO) exercises sacrifice the
same proportion of lifetime to obtain a health improve-
ment, irrespective of the absolute amount. However, evi-
dence on these constant proportional trade-offs (CPTOs) is
mixed, indicating that these versions of the QALY model
do not represent preferences. Still, it may be the case that a
more general version of the QALY model represents
preferences. This version has the property that people want
to sacrifice the same proportion of utilities of lifetime for a
health improvement, irrespective of the amount of this
lifetime.
Methods We use a new method to correct TTO scores for
utility of life duration and test whether decision makers
trade off utility of duration and quality at the same rate
irrespective of duration.
Results We find a robust violation of CPTO for both
uncorrected and corrected TTO scores. Remarkably, we
find higher values for longer durations, contrary to most
previous studies. This represents the only study correcting
for utility of life duration to find such a violation.
Conclusions It seems that the trade-off of life years is
indeed not so constantly proportional and, therefore, that
health state valuations depend on durations.
Keywords Constant proportional trade-offs 
QALY model  TTO method  Utility of life duration
Abbreviations
QALY Quality-adjusted life year
TTO Time trade-off
CPTO Constant proportional trade-offs
MET Maximum endurable time
CE Certainty equivalence
FH Full health
D Death
BP Back pain
Introduction
The quality-adjusted life year (QALY) model has become
an important model in valuing health benefits. To make the
model practical, measurement methods are needed in order
to elicit the quality of life weights used in this model. One
such method is the time trade-off (TTO) method, which is
often used to derive (standard) quality of life weights for
health states to be used in economic evaluations [1, 2]. The
popularity of the TTO, however, cannot be explained by
the absence of methodological problems. On the contrary,
the TTO has been shown to be prone to several influences
such as loss aversion, scale compatibility and utility of
duration (i.e., discounting) [3].
One important and necessary assumption of the QALY
model is that of constant proportional trade-offs (CPTO).
In the context of TTO, CPTO basically requires that the
estimated TTO value should be the same for different
durations. For example, if in valuing some imperfect health
state b using a 10-year TTO, people would indicate they
are willing to trade off 2 years (that is 20% of total time),
then CPTO requires them to give up 2 months when using
a 10-month TTO or 2 days when using a 10-day TTO. The
proportion traded should always be equal (i.e. 20%). CPTO
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is also practically important when one considers the use of
the valuation of health states in economic evaluations and
medical decision making: they are attached to such health
states regardless of the duration of the health problem,
normally. If, therefore, the assumption of CPTO does not
hold, health state valuations could be time dependent—that
is, health states could be valued differently when their
durations differ.
The evidence on the validity of the CPTO assumption is
mixed. Some empirical studies found support [4–6], while
others rejected it [7, 8], or found mixed results [9]. Given
the importance of the assumption and the mixed evidence
for it, more research in this area seems warranted. In this
paper, we therefore discuss the current evidence regarding
CPTO on the basis of a literature review and highlight the
role of the utility of life duration in this debate. So far, most
studies that found violations of CPTO assumed linear utility
of life duration (i.e. no discounting of future life years), but
it seems implausible that their subjects would satisfy that
assumption. Therefore, if one was to correct for utility of
life duration curvature, these subjects might satisfy CPTO
in terms of utilities for life duration after all. That is, TTO
values corrected for utility of life duration curvature may
still be the same for different durations, despite the fact that
uncorrected TTO values vary with duration. It is important
to investigate this possibility, because it might indicate that
the QALY model does hold in a more general form and that
only the assumption regarding the shape of the utility of life
duration function has to be relaxed.
We present the results of an experiment to test the
CPTO assumption, in which we used both uncorrected
TTO values and TTO values that were corrected for utility
of life duration curvature. For this correction, we used the
risk-free utility of life duration elicitation method proposed
by Attema et al. [10]. Its advantages are that it does not
need to make specific parametric assumptions about the
utility for life duration function and that it is not influenced
by biases due to probability weighting and the inclusion of
the problematic outcome death.
This paper is organized as follows: we describe the the-
oretical background of CPTO in the next section and review
the existing literature that tested the CPTO assumption in
the literature review. Our experimental test is described in
the experimental section, followed by a presentation of the
results. The last section discusses the results and provides a
possible explanation for our findings in the form of a gen-
eralized relationship between duration and trade-offs.
Theory
As indicated, the TTO method is based on the QALY
model. The QALY model is a common way to describe
preferences over health profiles. Let h = (hj,…,hT) denote
a health profile, where h denotes the health state in period
t = j,…,T, where T is the decision maker’s final period of
life. Further, v(ht) is a value function that represents the
individual’s preferences over health quality and d(t)
denotes the corresponding weight attached to the value in
this period. It can then be shown that, under some rea-
sonable assumptions, h ¤ h0 if and only if
PT
t¼j1 dðtÞ
vðhtÞ
PT
t¼j1 dðtÞ  vðh0tÞ (we use t = j - 1 instead of
t = j because the first period (j = 1) starts at t = 0) [11].
We call Uðt; htÞ ¼
PT
t¼j1 dðtÞ  vðhtÞ the generalized
QALY model and assume that health profiles are evaluated
by this function.
In order to avoid confusion, we term v(ht) a (TTO) value
throughout the paper, whereas the function
PT
t¼j1 dðtÞis
termed the utility of life duration for the period between
t = j - 1 and t = T. Notice that this terminology differs
from some of the literature where preferences for health
states elicited in a riskless setting are termed ‘values’ and
preferences for health states elicited in a risky setting are
termed ‘utilities’.
CPTO holds if the proportion of remaining life years
that one is willing to give up for an improvement in health
status from any health state b1 to any health state b2 does
not depend on the absolute number of remaining life years
[12] (Pliskin et al. [12] considered a probabilistic frame-
work, but the definition is similar for deterministic
frameworks [13, 14]). This means that for any health state
b1 and any health state b2, the individuals are prepared to
give up the proportion nb1  nb2
 
nb1 ¼ 1  nb2

nb1.
Thus, there exists a number q C 0, such that q ¼
nb2

nb1and individuals are willing to give up the same
proportion (1 - q) of lifetime irrespective of its duration
(nb1).
Generalized CPTO holds if the proportion of remaining
utility of life years that one is willing to give up for an
improvement in health status from any health state b1 to
any health state b2 does not depend on the utility of the
absolute number of remaining life years. This would mean
that individuals are prepared to give up the proportion
Pnb1
t¼0 dðtÞ 
Pnb2
t¼0 dðtÞ
 Pnb1
t¼0 dðtÞ ¼ 1 
Pnb2
t¼0 dðtÞ
Pnb1
t¼0 dðtÞ.
Then, there may exist a number q C 0, such that
q ¼Pnb2t¼0 dðtÞ
Pnb1
t¼0 dðtÞ and individuals are willing to
give up the same proportion (1 - q) of utility of life
duration irrespective of its duration (nb1). Generalized
CPTO is consistent with the earlier defined generalized
QALY model.
Investigators of TTO often assume linear utility of life
duration, so that
PT
t¼j1 dðtÞ ¼ T  j þ 1 or d tð Þ ¼ 1 for
each t. The model then simplifies to the linear QALY
model, where equal weight is assumed to be attached to all
health state values regardless of their timing. Then, the
value of a health state b1 = b can be elicited by asking the
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subject to give some period nFH in full health (FH),
followed by death (D), which makes him indifferent to a
stated period in health state b (nb), also followed by death.
That is, the indifference relation (h1 = FH, …, hnFH =
FH, hnFH?1=D, …, hnb = D) * (h1 = b, …, hnb = b) is
obtained. Under the linear QALY model, this indifference
can be represented by the following equation:
nFH  vðFHÞ þ ðnb  nFHÞ  vðDÞ ¼ nb  vðbÞ: ð1Þ
If the value function over health is normalized so that
v(FH) = 1 and v(D) = 0, we get the following simple
expression for v(b):
vðbÞ ¼ nFH
nb
: ð2Þ
This means that the value of health state b is obtained by
dividing the number of years in full health by the number
of years in health state b that is equivalent for the subject.
Under this model, q ¼ nFH

nb and CPTO holds.
Pliskin et al. [12] gave an axiomatic derivation of a
particular version of the QALY model for constant health
profiles and proved that for the utility function of life dura-
tion to be a power function
PT
t¼j1 dðtÞ ¼ ðT  j þ 1Þc

for c [ 0;
PT
t¼j1 dðtÞ ¼ ðT  j þ 1Þc for c\0 andPT
t¼j1 dðtÞ ¼ logðT  j þ 1Þ for c ¼ 0Þ; it is necessary
that CPTO be valid (note that the linear function is a special
case of this function for c = 1). For example, for c = 0.5,
nb = 10 and v(b) = 0.6, we have Uðt; bÞ ¼
100:5  0:6 ¼ 1:90. The response to a TTO question (nb)
would then be Uðt; bÞ ¼ ðnFHÞ0:5  1 ¼ 1:90 , nFH ¼
1:902 ¼ 3:61, so q = 3.61/10 = 0.36. Similarly, for
nb = 20, we get Uðt; bÞ ¼ 200:5  0:6 ¼ 2:68 and the
TTO response would be Uðt; bÞ ¼ ðnFHÞ0:5  1 ¼ 2:68 ,
nFH ¼ 2:682 ¼ 7:18, so q = 7.18/20 = 0.36 again.
However, individuals may have a utility of life duration
function that does not belong to the power family, but
instead to some other parametric family. In that case,
CPTO does not need to be confirmed, but it may very well
be that the answers of such individuals do satisfy gen-
eralized CPTO. In other words, the generalized QALY
model may still hold. When the utility function for life
duration is exponential instead of a power, for example,
CPTO may hold in terms of utilities of life years but not in
terms of the absolute number of life years. In other words,
the conventional CPTO assumption is not necessary for the
generalized QALY model to hold.
Suppose, for example, that an individual has an expo-
nential utility for life duration function, given byPT
t¼j1 dðtÞ ¼ 5 1  e0:1ðTjþ1Þ
 
1  e2ð Þ. However, as
commonly the case, researchers may assume the function
to be linear:
PT
t¼j1 dðtÞ ¼ T  j þ 1. Figure 1 graphically
shows these functions. The figure makes clear that the
linear function implies no discounting, whereas future life
years are discounted in the exponential function, with the
gap between linear and exponential utility increasing the
larger the number of life years. Now suppose that this
individual has completed two TTO tasks, one for nb = 10
and one for nb = 20. Her indifference values are nFH = 5
and nFH = 7.73, respectively. According to the linear
function, we obtain q ¼P5t¼0 dðtÞ
.P10
t¼0 dðtÞ ¼ 5=10 ¼
0:5 for the former task, and q = 7.73/20 = 0.39 for the
latter, which obviously violates CPTO. However, accord-
ing to the exponential function, we have q = 2.28/3.66 =
0.62 and q = 3.11/5 = 0.62, respectively, so generalized
CPTO is not violated.
Testing the generalized CPTO assumption requires the
correction of TTO values for utility of life duration cur-
vature. Recently, Attema et al. [10] have developed a new
procedure to correct for this curvature. Attema and Brou-
wer [15] showed how this method can be used to correct
TTO values.
CPTO can be violated due to other reasons than dis-
counting as well (e.g. [3]), like loss aversion (i.e. the
phenomenon that people are more sensitive to losses than
to gains when viewed from a particular reference point
[16]), and maximum endurable time (MET, i.e. the fact that
some bad health states can only be endured during some
period of time after which its value becomes negative).
Depending on the magnitude and direction of these effects,
CPTO may be violated in both directions or the effects may
0
4
8
12
16
20
0 4 8 12 16 20
Life years
Ut
ili
ty
Linear utility of life
duration
Exponential utility of
life duration
Fig. 1 Example of different utility for life duration functions
Qual Life Res (2010) 19:489–497 491
123
cancel out so that CPTO is not violated on the aggregate—
or may mistakenly be perceived as not being violated if the
violation itself is balanced by other effects. A better
understanding of the validity of the assumption of CPTO,
therefore, depends on a better understanding of the mag-
nitudes of these effects and correcting for them as far as
possible. In the conventional TTO procedure, loss aversion
may cause subjects to be overly reluctant to give up life
years, leading to relatively high health state values. MET
will lead to higher values for bad health states for short
durations, because for longer durations, extra time in that
health state will be valued negatively. While loss aversion
is more likely to be present in all TTO valuations, the
presence of MET depends on the health state valued.
Moreover, the influence of utility of life duration curvature
is also present in normal TTO valuations, but it will likely
vary with the time horizon chosen and can be corrected for.
In the next section, we highlight the existing evidence
regarding CPTO. In doing so, we indicate whether the
performed studies corrected for utility of life duration
curvature or used health states that could lead to MET
effects.
Literature review
As noted previously, the evidence about the empirical
validity of the CPTO assumption is mixed. This section
highlights the existing evidence on the validity of the
CPTO assumption. Our review adds to the one by Tsuchiya
and Dolan [17], in that we also take into account studies
published after 2002 and consider correction for utility
of life duration. Table 1 presents the empirical studies
regarding CPTO and summarizes their main results. The
second column of this table shows the stimulus durations
(nb). The third and fourth columns indicate, respectively,
whether or not a health state that may be susceptible to
MET was used and whether or not the authors corrected for
Table 1 Overview of CPTO studies
Study Life years used MET health
state
Utility
correction
TTO long …TTO
short
Sample
Sackett and Torrance [8] 3 months
8 years
Life expectancy
Mixed No \ General population
Patients
Pliskin et al. [12] 5 years
15 years
No Yes = Pilot sample
Miyamoto and Eraker [18] 1, 2, 15, 16, 20, 24 No No \(p values
not reported)
Patients
Hall et al. [19] 10% of LE
50% of LE
Life expectancy
Mixed No = Women 40–70
50% patients
Cook et al. [20] 1 year
12 years
No No = Patients
Stiggelbout et al. [7] 3, 10, 15 years
3, 5, 10 years
5, 20, LE
No No \ Patients
Stalmeier et al. [25] 5, 10, 25, 50 Yes Yes =Except for t = 5 Students
Stalmeier et al. [21] 5, 10, 25, 50 Yes No C Students
Bleichrodt and Johannesson [4] 10 and 30 years No No = Students
Unic et al. [22] 5, 10 and higher No No [ Healthy women
Kirsch and McGuire [23] 2 and 10 years Mixed No B General population
Martin et al. [26] 5, 10, 15 years No Yes \ Older cardiovascular
disease patients
(mean age 61)
Stalmeier et al. [24] 10 and 20 years Yes No \(p values
not reported)
Students
Patients
Bleichrodt et al. [9] 13, 19, 24, 31, 38 years No No C Students
Dolan and Stalmeier [5] 10 and 20 years Yes No \ Students
Van der Pol and Roux [6] 20 and 50 years No Yes = Students
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utility of life duration. The fifth column shows the results
in terms of significance of the difference between shorter
and longer durations at the 5% level. Finally, the sixth
column indicates which kind of sample was analyzed. The
table emphasizes the amount of variation in results. Some
studies confirmed CPTO, but most studies rejected it.
These violations, however, are not easily interpretable
since CPTO was violated in both directions, i.e., when
compared to longer durations, sometimes the proportion
traded was relatively small for shorter durations and
sometimes the proportion traded was larger. The finding
that the TTO values of some health states were higher for
short durations (i.e. relatively fewer life years were being
traded in that case) was somewhat more common.
Sackett and Torrance [8] used a short, an intermediate
and a long duration for a general population sample and a
patient sample, and reported higher TTO values for short
durations. Miyamoto and Eraker [18] reported evidence of
no trade at all for durations smaller than 1 year for 25% of
the subjects, whereas these people did trade off time for
longer durations. Therefore, TTO values were higher for
short durations than for long durations. Hall et al. [19]
compared three different durations, 10, 50, and 100% of
life expectancy. No violations of CPTO were found. Cook
et al. [20] interviewed patients. Their TTO values were not
significantly different between a duration of 1 year and one
of 12 years. Stiggelbout et al. [7] used short and interme-
diate durations and found a violation of CPTO with TTO
values for short durations being higher than those for long
durations. Bleichrodt and Johannesson [4] used an inter-
mediate and a long duration. They found no violation of
CPTO at the aggregate level.
Stalmeier et al. [21] used bad health states to test for
MET. They could not reject CPTO when comparing
durations of 10 years and longer, but did find significantly
lower TTO values for the 5-year horizon. Unic et al. [22]
estimated TTO values for several durations in a sample of
healthy women and found lower values for shorter dura-
tions. Kirsch and McGuire [23] compared a short and an
intermediate duration and found mixed evidence. They
reported higher TTO values for the short duration for bad
health states, but no significant differences for moderate
health states. They attributed this to subjects who valued
additional time in a bad health state as worse than dead
after some duration (i.e. MET). Stalmeier et al. [24] and
Dolan and Stalmeier [5] found smaller TTO values for
longer durations when comparing two intermediate dura-
tions in a severe health state. This may again have been
caused by MET. Bleichrodt et al. [9] used five different
durations that were not multiples of 5, so that they were not
very susceptible to a proportional heuristic. These dura-
tions were of an intermediate and long-term nature. They
found higher TTO values for long durations than short
durations for one procedure, indicating that people are
willing to trade off relatively fewer life years for higher
amounts. For another procedure, however, they could not
reject CPTO.
We found four studies that corrected for utility of life
duration curvature. Pliskin et al. [12] used a certainty
equivalence (CE) question to correct for utility of life
duration and found no violation at the aggregate level.
However, their sample was very small. Stalmeier et al. [25]
also found no violation of CPTO. They also corrected for
utility curvature by means of the CE method and estimated
several parametric models. Martin et al. [26] used three
short and short-intermediate durations and corrected for
utility curvature by means of CE questions. In a sample of
cardiovascular patients, they found smaller TTO values for
longer durations. Van der Pol and Roux [6] compared TTO
values for a long-intermediate duration (20 years) and a
very long duration (50 years). Further, they corrected for
discounting (which is equivalent to utility of life duration
in our definition) by means of one discounting question.
They found no violation of CPTO, neither for uncorrected
nor for individually corrected values.
To summarize, sixteen empirical studies of CPTO were
found. Six of these did not reject CPTO, six found lower
TTO values for longer durations, one found the opposite
and three found mixed results. There is no clear influence
of correcting for discounting nor is there a clear influence
of MET. It appears difficult, therefore, to derive any defi-
nite answers from the literature regarding CPTO. Most
evidence points toward higher values for short durations,
yet all but one of these studies did not correct for utility of
life duration curvature, which can strongly influence
results, given the time horizons chosen. It appears that
more evidence is required in order to understand the rela-
tionship between health state duration and valuation better.
Experiment
We performed an experimental study testing the conven-
tional and generalized CPTO assumptions in the context of
a larger study (see [10] and [15] for more details). Seventy
students were recruited from different faculties of Erasmus
University Rotterdam and were paid a fixed amount of
€12.50 to join the experiment in a behavioral laboratory.
The questions were administered by computer, using a
program which was specially designed for this study. The
experimental sessions were run with one or two subjects at
a time, and lasted at most 45 min. One of the authors was
present during the entire session to answer questions. Our
experiment entailed two phases. In both phases, we used
regular back pain as the health state of interest (b). Back
pain is a common, easily understandable and non-severe
Qual Life Res (2010) 19:489–497 493
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health state. The latter aspect minimizes the influence of
MET. We described the health state in terms of the Euro-
Qol 5D terminology as 11221. Further, we stressed to the
subjects that the health state ‘full health’ (FH) meant they
were able to function perfectly on all the five EuroQoL
dimensions (11111), irrespective of their age. The
descriptions of back pain and full health were printed on
cards and handed to the subjects (see Appendix A). In the
first phase of the experiment, we elicited the utility func-
tion for life duration, used to correct the answers to the
TTO questions that were posed in the second phase.
The first phase was based on the notion that if utility of
life duration is non-linear, the estimate obtained by (3) can
be biased. Rather, one would then need to use the gen-
eralized QALY model. Without restrictions on d(t) (and
using the notation introduced earlier), the indifference
implied by the TTO under this model would give the
following equation (setting v(FH) = 1 again):
Xnb
t¼0
dðtÞvðbÞ ¼
XnFH
t¼0
dðtÞ: ð3Þ
Eliciting v(b) thus requires the elicitation of the
weights d(t). We accomplished this by employing the
recently proposed risk-free elicitation method of Attema
et al. [10]. In short, the method presents a subject with
two health scenarios. In the first scenario, the subject is in
a good health state (g) at first. After some time, t, she
moves to a worse health state (h) for the remainder of the
total time period P. In the second scenario, the subject
first is in the worse health state (h) and at time t moves to
the better health state (g) for the remainder of P. The
value of t is elicited that makes the subject indifferent
between these scenarios. This value indicates the point
where the period before t yields as much utility as the
period after t. When t is smaller than the midpoint of the
period P, this indicates concavity of the utility function
over life duration. Then, as a result, raw TTO values will
be biased downwards and correcting for this concavity
results in higher utility scores. More detailed information
about the exact shape of the utility function can be
obtained by repeating this procedure (using the first
estimate of t as input in the next exercise, etc). (See [10]
for details on the risk-free method and [15] for details on
correcting TTO values using this method.)
In the second phase of the experiment, we used two
approaches to value the specified health state. First, in a
conventional procedure, we fixed the duration of the health
state with back pain (nb) at 14 (BP14) and 27 years (BP27),
respectively, and asked for the number of years in full
health (nFH) that they considered equivalent (Appendix B
shows the formulation of the associated questions). We
used a 1-shot response to obtain indifferences. If the
generalized QALY model holds, we obtain the following
equalities:
Xn14
t¼0
dðtÞvðbÞ ¼
XnFH1
t¼0
dðtÞ and
Xn27
t¼0
dðtÞvðbÞ ¼
XnFH2
t¼0
dðtÞ:
ð4Þ
We are then able to compute v(b) since we have the
estimates of the utilities of life duration, which, using the
notation of the experimental section, can also be expressed
as:
X14
t¼0
dðtÞvðbÞ ¼ q
X14
t¼0
dðtÞ , vðbÞ ¼ q and
X27
t¼0
dðtÞvðbÞ ¼ q
X27
t¼0
dðtÞ , vðbÞ ¼ q:
ð5Þ
To summarize, if v(b) varies for the two durations, then q
will vary as well, and both generalized CPTO and the
generalized QALY model will be rejected. It may be the
case, on the other hand, that the power QALY model is
rejected because q = nFH/nb is different for the two
durations, but that the generalized QALY model cannot
be rejected because q ¼PnFHt¼0 dðtÞ
Pnb
t¼0 dðtÞmay still hold
depending on the precise form of the utility of life duration
function. Our test, therefore, involved the comparison of
v(b) for the two durations according to both (2) and (3).
Second, in an alternative procedure, we fixed the dura-
tion in full health (nFH) at 10 (FH10) and 22 (FH22) years,
respectively, and asked for the number of years with back
pain (nb) that they considered equivalent (see Appendix B).
The subsequent test of CPTO was performed along the
same lines as specified earlier. The order of the questions
was random.
Results
Fifty-six subjects (80%) were included in the analysis. The
other 14 subjects were dropped from the sample because
they had at least one inconsistent answer or had not
understood the utility elicitation part. The median results
did not change when including these subjects. The average
age of the 56 included subjects was 21.8 years (sd = 2.99),
and 36% were female.
In Table 2, we present some summary statistics con-
cerning the uncorrected and corrected TTO values (these
results were used to test the procedural invariance of TTO
in Attema and Brouwer [27]). The difference between these
values is around 0.05 (6%) for the BP questions and 0.13
(30%) for the FH questions (see last row of Table 2).
In order to test the conventional and generalized CPTO
assumptions, we compared the small and the long duration
494 Qual Life Res (2010) 19:489–497
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for both elicitation procedures. For both uncorrected and
corrected TTO values, CPTO was rejected, with the value
being higher for longer than for shorter durations (paired
t-tests, p \ 0.01). This finding is in contrast with most of
the aforementioned studies.
In the FH questions, our results seem to be caused partly
by the large fraction of subjects (23%) that gave the same
answer to FH10 and FH22. In the BP questions, many
subjects (34%) answered as if using a proportional heuristic,
i.e. their answer to the second question was twice the
amount of their answer to the first question. Because the
input of the second question was somewhat lower than
twice the amount of the first question (27 \ 2*14), this
resulted in a higher uncorrected TTO value for a longer
duration for these subjects. We, therefore, repeated the
analysis excluding these subjects, which still yielded a
significant difference between the different durations. For
BP14 and BP27, CPTO was still rejected in the same
direction (p \ 0.02). For the FH questions, FH22 also still
yielded higher TTO values than FH10, both when excluding
proportional heuristic subjects and when excluding subjects
who gave the same answer to both questions (p \ 0.01. For
the BP questions, there were no subjects giving the same
answers to both questions). As a result, for the alternative
procedure, there was also a violation of CPTO in the
opposite direction of most of the earlier found violations.
Summarizing, our results indicate that correcting for
utility curvature and avoiding MET does not seem to be
sufficient to restore the validity of the assumption of CPTO.
Conclusion
What can we infer from this study other than that we have
added to the confusion regarding constant proportional
trade-off? We believe some important observations need to
be made.
First, the review of the literature shows that violations of
CPTO are common. Though often the violation causes
shorter durations to result in a decreased willingness to
trade and, therefore, higher health state valuations, which
may partly be due to failing to correct for utility of life
duration, the opposite has also been shown. The reviewed
studies differ in many respects, including the time horizon
chosen and whether a correction for utility of life duration
curvature has been applied. Not many studies did the latter.
Of the four that did, three found no violation of CPTO,
while one found that shorter durations resulted in higher
valuations [26]. The fact that the latter study used relatively
old patients (average age of 61) in their study may have
influenced results, not only because of the way they view
health problems, but also because of the fact that their
subjective life expectancy may have been less than the
projected ones. (See [28] on how this could bias the results.)
Such differences between the studies make it difficult to
derive general conclusions from the existing evidence.
The present study was clearly small and the sample
consisted of students, hampering generalization. Still, we
found a robust violation of CPTO for both uncorrected and
corrected TTO values in our sample. Remarkably, this
violation is in the opposite direction of most of the previ-
ously found violations of CPTO [17] and the only study
correcting for utility of life duration curvature to find such
a violation of CPTO.
After correcting for utility of life duration curvature,
CPTO is still rejected, which indicates a more fundamental
rejection of the QALY model. It seems that individuals do
not trade off utility of life duration for health status at a
constant rate, but instead at a rate that depends on the dura-
tion involved. For relatively long durations, like the ones
used in our study, the amount of years traded is relatively low
also after correction for utility of life duration curvature.
Given this finding, the plausibility of relatively high TTO
values for very short durations (who would trade off two days
Table 2 TTO values
Difference between BP14 and
BP27: 0.04 (6%, p \ 0.01)
Difference between corrected
BP14 and corrected BP27: 0.05
(7%, p \ 0.01)
Difference between FH10 and
FH22: 0.16 (44%. p \ 0.01)
Difference between corrected
FH10 and corrected FH22: 0.18
(37%, p \ 0.01)
BP14 BP27 FH10 FH22
Uncorrected values
Mean 0.71 0.75 0.37 0.54
Standard error 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Interquartile range 0.64–0.86 0.73–0.89 0.2–0.5 0.39–0.63
Range 0.07–1 0.07–1 0.1–0.94 0.22–0.94
Average number of years
required/sacrificed
4.07 6.73 27.30 24.79
Corrected values
Mean 0.75 0.80 0.49 0.67
Standard error 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Interquartile range 0.69–0.88 0.69–0.94 0.35–0.64 0.52–0.82
Range 0.09–1 0.13–1 0.09–0.94 0.29–0.98
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to avoid low back pain when having only ten days left to
live?) and the diverse violations of CPTO reported in the
literature (which indeed must be related to the fact that TTO
values vary strongly between studies as reported by Arnesen
and Trommald [29]), it is interesting to hypothesize on the
shape of this relationship between duration and trade-offs.
Given the importance of loss aversion in the TTO [3, 9],
we hypothesize that a possible explanation for the varia-
tion in findings and, therefore, for a general relationship
between health state duration and health state valuation in
TTO is driven by this phenomenon. In a conventional TTO
with a ‘short’ duration, loss aversion may relate especially
to the amount of time left to live and stronger for smaller
time horizons (durations). Loss aversion then causes sub-
jects to be overly reluctant to give up life years, leading to
relatively high TTO values. For ‘long’ durations, on the
other hand, the absolute amount of years sacrificed may
become dominant in the trade-off, i.e. the reference point
of the subjects changes, with people being reluctant to
trade off more than some absolute amount of time. Thus,
the absolute amount of time remaining is most influential
when the TTO uses short durations and the absolute
amount of time sacrificed is most influential for longer
durations. The result will be that individuals give up fewer
years for short and long durations, and will be less driven
by these considerations in between these two points,
causing TTO values to be a U-shaped function of duration.
The reviewed studies did not investigate short, intermediate
and long durations together, and, hence, future research
testing a wide range of durations using a within-subject
design is called for to formally test this hypothesis.
For now, it seems that the (generalized) QALY model
may be too simple, that the trade-off of life years is indeed not
so constantly proportional and, therefore, that health state
valuations may depend on the duration of these health states.
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Appendix A: health state descriptions
(translated from Dutch)
Card 1—Regular back pain
You have regular back pain. This has the following
consequences for your functioning in daily life:
• You have no problems in walking about.
• You have no problems to wash or dress yourself.
• You have some problems with your usual activities.
• You have moderate pain or other discomfort.
• You are not anxious or depressed.
Card 2—Full health
You have no complaints and are in perfect health. This has
the following consequences for your functioning in daily
life:
• You have no problems in walking about.
• You have no problems to wash or dress yourself.
• You have no problems with your usual activities.
• You have no pain or other discomfort.
• You are not anxious or depressed.
Appendix B: instructions (translated from Dutch)
BP14 (BP27)
Imagine you have two options. In one option, you have 14
(27) years to live in an impaired health state, i.e. one with
regular back pain (see the description), after which you will
die painlessly. In the other option, you live for a smaller
number of years, but in full health. Indicate how many
years you would be willing to live in full health such that
you are indifferent between these possibilities.
FH10 (FH22)
Imagine you have two options. In one option, you have 10
(22) years to live in full health, after which you will die
painlessly. In the other option, you live for a larger number
of years, but in an impaired health state, i.e. one with
regular back pain (see the description). Indicate how many
years you would be willing to live with regular back pain
such that you are indifferent between these possibilities.
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